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IT IS POLITICAL: 
USING THE MODELS OF JUDICIAL 
DECISION MAKING TO EXPLAIN THE 
IDEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF TITLE VII 
KATE WEBBER† 
Scholars and observers often explain or interpret United 
States Supreme Court decisions based on the ideology of the 
sitting Justices.1  Many offer a similarly political account of the 
Court’s decisions in actions brought under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19642 (“Title VII”).  Certain events in the history of 
† Associate Professor of Law, Shepard Broad College of Law at Nova 
Southeastern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 
Political Science, Tufts University. Special thanks to the organizers and participants 
of the Ninth Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment 
Law and the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association for the 
opportunity to present this Article. 
1 E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age 
Five, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 13, 15 (2010) (describing the United States Supreme 
Court’s cases during the October 2009 term as “divided along ideological lines—with 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side and Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor on the other”); Barbara A. Perry, The “Bush Twins?” Roberts, Alito, and 
the Conservative Agenda, 92 JUDICATURE 302, 302 (2009) (“[Justices Alito and 
Roberts’] initial Supreme Court opinions reflect a conservative agenda that reaches 
back to the conservatism of Ronald Reagan.”); Adam Liptak, Three Justices Bound 
by Beliefs, Not Just Gender, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at A11 (describing the 
decisions of Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan as the result of their liberal 
ideology). Indeed, confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees reflect the 
assumption that the appointee’s ideology will lead to certain votes. See, e.g., Michael 
J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 247–48 
(2005). 
2 See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, 
and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 463 (2005) (“As the membership of the Supreme Court began 
to change, so too did the jurisprudence on Title VII.”); David A. Green, Why the 
African-American Community Should Be Concerned About Supreme Court Nominee, 
Samuel A. Alito: His Potential Impact on Title VII Cases, 33 S.U. L. REV. 425, 427, 
436 (2006) (concluding that Justice Alito’s conservative views would lead to 
restrictive decisions on Title VII issues); Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New 
Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, Results, and Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 255, 261–63 (2012) (describing the effect of conservative Justices on Title VII 
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Title VII suggest ideological decision making by the Supreme 
Court.  Dozens of the Court’s Title VII opinions are split between 
the conservative and liberal Justices.3  On three separate 
occasions, including, most recently, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009,4 a more liberal Congress amended Title VII to 
override the Supreme Court’s conservative interpretation of the 
statute.5  Yet, subsequent to each of these amendments, the 
conservative Justices continued to vote to restrict Title VII, 
apparently following their political preference over Congressional 
intent.6 
The full history of Title VII, however, does not conclusively 
establish that the Supreme Court decides cases according to 
ideological viewpoint.  Although numerous split decisions fall 
along ideological lines,7 other cases, including a number of 
unanimous decisions,8 reflect votes contrary to political viewpoint 
and potentially indicate a different dynamic.  The fifty years of  
 
 
jurisprudence); Songer, supra note 1, at 249 (“[T]he increasingly conservative 
composition of the federal judiciary may explain a significant part of the decline in 
successful Title VII challenges to facially-neutral employment practices.”). Songer 
further explains, “Numerous commentators have posited that federal judges 
appointed by Republican presidents are more skeptical of civil rights claims than 
Democratic appointees.” Id. at 249 n.11 (citing Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, 
Note, All the President’s Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan’s Appointments to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 776–77 (1987)). 
3 E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; Connecticut v. 
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); see also infra note 162 (listing cases). 
4 Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
5 See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of the three amendments. 
6 See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, 
AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 13–15 (2004) (noting that 
following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court still felt free to create its 
own employer-friendly standard for punitive damages, contrary to the language of 
the statute); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1456–58 (2001) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amending Title VII and 
finding that the conservative Court ignored Congress’s clear message that it 
intended a broader interpretation of the statute). 
7 See infra note 162. 
8 See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP., 562 U.S. 170 (2011); Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006); see also Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 
Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 281, 294–96 (2011) (describing a series of unanimous Supreme Court 
decisions on Title VII). 
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2015] IT IS POLITICAL 843 
Title VII jurisprudence, therefore, present the opportunity to 
assess whether Justices’ votes on issues of employment 
discrimination are determined by their respective ideologies. 
To answer this question, this Article turns to the work of 
political science scholars, specifically, the models of judicial 
decision making developed by political theorists over the past two 
decades.9  These models use sophisticated empirical techniques to 
test whether the Justices of the Supreme Court vote according to 
their ideologies and to explain the circumstances when Justices 
vote contrary to their political viewpoints.10  Their work can be 
divided into three predominant models—attitudinal, strategic 
and integrated?all of which agree that that ideology influences 
Supreme Court decisions11 but offer different explanations for the 
exceptions when the Court’s ideological pursuit is apparently 
constrained.12  The political science models therefore offer the 
potential to explain Title VII’s varied jurisprudence. 
This potential, however, is not fully realized.  The strategic 
and integrated models fail to effectively explain a significant 
portion of the Supreme Court’s Title VII decisions because these 
models have generally failed to study the effect of statutory 
overrides on the Court’s decision making.  This Article therefore 
draws on the few studies of overrides that are available, and 
some of the more context-specific analyses, to draw a more 
9 E.g., RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR. ET AL., DECISION MAKING BY THE MODERN 
SUPREME COURT 28–49 (2011). See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
10 E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 312–26; Mario Bergara et al., 
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 
28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 260–67 (2003). See generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST 
MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS 
JUSTICES MAKE (2011); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9. 
11 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 53 (concluding that Court decisions reflect 
“ideological predilections,” among other factors); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 
312–27 (describing the attitudinal model conclusion that ideology affects Supreme 
Court decisions); Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 267 (explaining the strategic 
model study conclusion that, in addition to strategic concerns, ideology influences 
the Court). 
12 See, e.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16 (explaining that the 
Supreme Court Justices are “policy-motivated,” but also constrained by the law, as 
well as by the elected branches); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10–13 (noting 
that Justices are constrained in their ideological decision making by the potential 
response of the elected branches). But see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 323–51 
(finding empirical evidence of ideology in Supreme Court decision making but 
finding no evidence that the preferences of the elected branches constrained it). 
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nuanced model for Title VII and to account for the apparent 
exceptions to ideological decision making.  Ultimately, this 
Article asserts that the history of Title VII is not only political, 
but also that the Supreme Court exhibits strong resistance to any 
restraint on ideological voting in the area of employment 
discrimination. 
In Part I, this Article details the key features of Title VII’s 
history, explaining the statute, the significant role the Supreme 
Court has played in its interpretation, and the history of 
congressional intervention to override Supreme Court decisions 
on key issues.  Part II reviews the existing evidence for and 
against an ideological interpretation of Title VII’s case law.  Part 
III introduces the political science models of judicial decision 
making and applies the models to Title VII.  Part III also details 
the models’ evidence of ideological voting by the Supreme Court 
and matches this evidence with voting patterns in Title VII 
cases.  Part III further examines the challenge of the exceptions, 
that is, the cases where the Justices did not vote according to 
their ascribed ideology in interpreting Title VII.  Part III also 
explores whether the political science models can explain these 
exceptions while still maintaining the basic premise of ideological 
voting.  Concluding in Part IV, this Article asserts that the 
Supreme Court is particularly ideological in its decision making 
on issues of minority rights and, as a result, many of the typical 
constraints on the Court have not affected, and will not affect, its 
ideological interpretation of Title VII. 
I. THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII 
Title VII’s jurisprudence spans the terms of three Chief 
Justices?Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Chief Justice Roberts13?and twenty-three Justices have 
interpreted the statute over its history.14  During this time, 
13 See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) 
(Roberts Court); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc. 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (Rehnquist 
Court); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Burger Court). 
14 The earliest Title VII case that the Supreme Court decided was in 1971, in 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., at which time the Supreme Court was comprised 
of Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, Marshall, Black, Douglas, Harlan, 
Brennan, White, and Blackmun. 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Members of the Supreme 
Court, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015). Since that time, the following other Justices have had the 
opportunity to consider Title VII cases: Justices Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, 
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Congress has weighed in with four major amendments, three of 
which were passed in order to overturn Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the statute’s meaning.15  The development of Title 
VII’s case law and its history of amendments are the starting 
points for analyzing the role that ideology may have played in the 
Justices’ decisions.  In conducting this review, it is generally 
understood that decisions or amendments expanding Title VII’s 
reach or easing the plaintiff-employee’s burden in litigation are 
considered liberal, and decisions or amendments that favor 
defendant-employers are considered conservative.16 
Rehnquist, Souter, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Court most recently considered Title VII in EEOC v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
15 The first amendment to Title VII came in the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Among other changes, this Act 
extended Title VII to reach employers with as few as fifteen employees, as well as 
state and local governments; it also lengthened the statute of limitations. Elinor P. 
Schroeder, Title VII at 40: A Look Back, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 18, 22–
23. Substantively, it defined Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on 
religion to include “ ‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief’ 
and to add a requirement of reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 22 (quoting Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2, § 701(j), 86 Stat. 
103). The subsequent three amendments were passed for the specific purpose of 
overturning Supreme Court decisions and are discussed in detail later in Part I. See 
infra Part I.C. This Article describes the amendments as Congress’s response to the 
Court’s interpretation of Title VII. Each amendment, however, was signed by the 
President at the time and, thus, could also be viewed as the response of both elected 
branches. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 
16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 
Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
16 See, e.g., Christopher Smith, Polarized Circuits: Party Affiliation of 
Appointing Presidents, Ideology, and Circuit Court Voting in Race and Gender Civil 
Rights Cases, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 160, 165 (2011) (asserting that a vote 
in favor of a race or gender civil rights claim is a vote in a liberal direction) (citing 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 19 (2006) (arguing that voting in favor of a discrimination 
plaintiff is liberal)); William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in 
the Reagan Years (1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 
MARQ. L. REV. 645, 685 (1994) (describing votes restricting Title VII as 
conservative); see also Harold J. Spaeth et al., Online Code Book: Decision Direction, 
SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (describing how this database of Supreme Court decisions 
coded “pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant[s]” and “anti-employer” outcomes as 
liberal and the reverse outcomes as conservative). 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 229 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 229 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX 3/24/16  12:16 PM 
846 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:841   
A. The Title VII Statute 
Title VII is just one provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,17 a broad statute passed in response to the civil rights 
movement and designed to address inequality in many areas of 
society.18  Title VII’s main antidiscrimination provision states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an  
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.19 
This prohibition bars intentional acts of disparate treatment 
based on race, gender, and the other protected categories.20  Title 
VII also forbids neutral employment policies that have a 
demonstrable disparate impact on a protected class.21  Title VII 
further prohibits harassment that is based on its covered 
statutes even if no tangible job action has occurred.22  Finally, in 
a separate statutory provision, Title VII bans retaliation against 
those who report or oppose violations of the statute.23 
 
 
17 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
18 Belton, supra note 2, at 432. See generally Schroeder, supra note 15, at 19–22 
(describing the history of the Civil Rights Act). 
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (West 2014). 
20 E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988); 
Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and 
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 429 (1995). 
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
22 E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986); EEOC 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29  C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2015). 
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting Title VII 
Since the statute’s passage, the Supreme Court has played a 
fundamental role in developing the law of Title VII.24  The Court 
has not only interpreted the meaning of Title VII’s language,25 
but has also created substantive doctrines26 and important 
evidentiary mechanisms for proving violations of the statute.27  
In the course of this lengthy case history, the Supreme Court 
has, in some cases, issued liberal decisions, which expanded or 
defined Title VII in a manner favorable to employees.  In other 
cases, the Supreme Court issued conservative decisions, which 
narrowed or defined the statute in a way that favors employers. 
For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 the Supreme 
Court created the doctrine of disparate impact liability under 
Title VII,29 which was later codified by Congress.30  Disparate 
impact prohibits neutral acts with discriminatory effects.31  The 
creation of this doctrine significantly expanded Title VII, which 
had originally only prohibited intentional discrimination.32  
24 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and 
Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) 
(describing the significant impact of the Court’s 1989 term on the reach of Title VII); 
Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the 
March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 22–
28 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court’s role in defining Title VII’s rules for 
affirmative action in the workplace). 
25 E.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003) (interpreting the 
Title VII subsection on the motivating factor standard of causation); Meritor Sav. 
Bank, 477 U.S. at 64–65 (interpreting Title VII’s language barring discrimination 
with respect to “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” to prohibit sexual 
harassment (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
26 E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S at 429–30 (creating the doctrine of disparate impact). 
27 E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973) 
(establishing a three-part test for proving discriminatory intent). 
28 401 U.S. 424. 
29 Id. at 429–30 (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was 
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
31 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30. 
32 Belton, supra note 2, at 434 (“The disparate impact theory . . . combats not 
intentional, obviously discriminatory policies, but a type of discrimination in which 
facially neutral practices are employed to unnecessarily and disparately exclude 
protected groups from employment opportunities. The Griggs disparate impact 
theory, as later codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, put to rest the 
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Later, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green,33 developed a three-part test that allows plaintiffs to prove 
discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence, a pro-
employee construction that provides a crucial mechanism for 
proving the invisible state of mind of the employer.34  In Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson,35 the Supreme Court held that sexual 
harassment was a form of sex discrimination under Title VII,36 
an interpretation that again substantively expanded the scope of 
Title VII and the conduct that the statute prohibits. 
The Court’s substantial role in the development of Title VII 
is not limited to expanding the reach of the statute.  In a number 
of opinions, the Court issued conservative decisions that 
significantly restricted the statute’s scope or made it more 
difficult for employee-plaintiffs to prove violations.37  For 
example, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,38 the Court limited 
Title VII’s reach by holding that pregnancy-based discrimination 
was not sex discrimination under the statute.39  Recently, the 
Supreme Court has issued decisions that made it difficult for 
employees to prove  harassment40 or retaliation41 claims under 
Title VII. 
view that evidence supporting a finding of intentional discrimination is the only way 
to establish a violation under civil rights statutes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
33 411 U.S. 792. 
34 Id. at 802–04; see also Green, supra note 2, at 428 (“In the early 1970s, the 
Supreme Court, liberally interpreting Title VII, established a procedure redressing 
invidious discrimination where there was no direct evidence and the plaintiff only 
had circumstantial evidence.”). 
35 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
36 Id. at 64–65; see also Ronald Turner, Making Title VII Law and Policy: The 
Supreme Court’s Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
575, 578 (2005) (“Title VII sexual harassment law ‘has been judge-made law’ and ‘is 
a judicial rather than a legislative creation.’ ” (footnote omitted)). 
37 Selmi, supra note 8, at 283 (“During the 1980s, the Supreme Court took a 
deeply conservative turn on issues of civil rights, particularly with respect to 
employment discrimination. The Court repeatedly reached adverse results for 
plaintiffs, and even in cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed, the Court would often 
impose significant limitations on the employment discrimination doctrine.”); see also 
Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. FORUM 109, 109 (2012) (“Changes in 
substantive discrimination law since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were 
tantamount to a virtual repeal. This was so not because of Congress; it was because 
of judges.” (footnote omitted)). 
38 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
39 Id. at 145–46. 
40 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (limiting employer 
liability for sexual harassment by narrowly defining the category of employees who 
are considered supervisors). 
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C. Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Title VII Decisions 
The Supreme Court’s role is one significant aspect of Title 
VII’s history; the second is the elected branches’ role in reversing 
the Court.  A number of the Supreme Court’s conservative Title 
VII decisions were so restrictive that the more liberal Congress 
amended Title VII for the specific purpose of overturning the 
Court.42  The earliest example of this type of congressional 
override occurred in 1978 when Congress passed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act43 (“PDA”) in response to the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in Gilbert.44  As noted above, in the Gilbert case, 
the Court held that the employer’s policy that discriminated 
against pregnancy and related conditions did not discriminate on 
the basis of sex.45  The PDA was drafted in direct response to this 
decision46 and overturned Gilbert by amending Title VII to state 
that “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”47 
Similarly, in the most extensive amendment of Title VII, the 
Civil Rights Act of 199148 (“CRA”), Congress overturned twelve 
Supreme Court decisions that had restricted Title VII and other 
federal antidiscrimination laws.49  For example, the CRA 
superseded the Supreme Court’s holding in Wards Cove Packing 
41 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (stating 
that plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under Title VII are required to prove that 
the retaliatory motive was a “but-for” cause of the employment action, not the more 
lenient standard of motivating factor causation). 
42 See e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 
516, 537–56 (2009). 
43 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
44 429 U.S. at 145–46. 
45 Id. 
46 Widiss, supra note 42, at 552–53. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Maurice Wexler et al., The Law of Employment 
Discrimination from 1985 to 2010, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 349, 351 (2010) 
(“Collectively, the substantive provisions of the 1991 CRA made it easier to assert 
race discrimination claims; added the right to jury trials in Title VII cases; 
established entitlement to limited compensatory and punitive damages for 
intentional discrimination; limited the use of mixed-motive defenses; allowed timely 
challenges to seniority systems and consent decrees; codified the Griggs v. Duke 
Power disparate-impact model; addressed the extraterritorial reach of Title VII; and 
permitted recovery of expert witness fees.” (footnotes omitted)). 
49 Widiss, supra note 42, at 516. 
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Co. v. Atonio,50 which had significantly expanded employers’ 
defenses to disparate impact claims.51  In one of the most 
significant examples, the CRA overturned the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.52  According to Price 
Waterhouse, employees with direct evidence of discrimination 
could succeed under Title VII by showing that discriminatory 
animus was a “substantial factor” in an employment decision,53 
and employers could escape liability if they could affirmatively 
prove the same decision would have occurred even in the absence 
of the animus.54  The CRA superseded this holding and lowered 
the causation standard to allow an employee to establish a Title 
VII claim if the discriminatory animus was a mere “motivating 
factor” in the decision.55  The CRA also restricted the Price 
Waterhouse “same decision” affirmative defense, by removing the 
employer’s ability to use it as a defense to liability and limiting 
that defense to the question of damages.56 
In the third and most recent example of congressional 
override, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200957 (“Ledbetter 
Act”), Congress overrode the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.58  In Ledbetter, the 
Court held that the Title VII statute of limitations for unequal 
pay claims began running on the date the discriminatory pay is 
established, even if the plaintiff was unaware of it.59  In 
Ledbetter, the plaintiff had been receiving lower compensation 
than similarly situated male employees, but only discovered it 
and asserted a claim of discrimination long after the initial 
compensation decisions that established the disparity were 
made.60  The Court rejected the argument that each paycheck 
could be a new violation that restarted the limitations period and 
50 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
51 Wexler et al., supra note 48, at 354 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 105, 
§ 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75). 
52 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
53 Id. at 265 (emphasis omitted). 
54 Id. at 266. 
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). 
56 § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
57 Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
58 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
59 Id. at 621, 628–29. 
60 Id. at 644–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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found that the plaintiff’s claims were untimely filed.61  As Justice 
Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the decision ignored the 
characteristics of pay disparities, which are often hidden, and 
significantly limited the plaintiff’s ability to bring discriminatory 
compensation claims.62  Justice Ginsburg specifically called on 
the legislature to act, and Congress did so with the Ledbetter 
Act, which superseded the Supreme Court’s decision by 
amending Title VII to specify that a discriminatory pay event 
occurs each time a paycheck is issued.63  Thus, the Ledbetter Act 
expands the time period for alleging claims of unequal pay and 
broadens plaintiffs’ ability to challenge this type of 
discrimination.64 
This overview of Title VII’s history already suggests 
ideological decision making by the Supreme Court.  Over the past 
fifty years, the Court has issued both liberal and conservative 
decisions interpreting Title VII, which could reflect the Court’s 
changing ideological composition.  Moreover, on three separate 
occasions a Democrat-controlled Congress overturned 
conservative Supreme Court decisions, suggesting a Court 
motivated by political belief more than concern for congressional 
intent or rebuke.65  These suggestions, however, are insufficient 
in themselves to establish ideological voting in Title VII cases, 
and, as explained below, scholarly analysis and voting patterns 
show conflicting views on this issue. 
II. CONFLICTING EVIDENCE OF IDEOLOGY-BASED 
 VOTING IN THE SUPREME COURT’S TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Disagreement Among Scholars 
It is common practice to explain or predict Supreme Court 
rulings based on the ideology of the Justices.66  A number of 
scholars of Title VII embrace this premise, believing that the 
outcomes of Supreme Court cases are influenced by the Justices’ 
61 Id. at 637 (majority opinion). 
62 Id. at 645, 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
63 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, sec. 3, § 706(e) 123 
Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012)). 
64 See id. 
65 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 42. 
66 E.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 1; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court 
Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 51, 57 (2008). 
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respective viewpoints.67  For example, Emmanuel Iheukwumere 
and Philip Aka analyzed a series of Supreme Court decisions on 
affirmative action, including analysis under Title VII.68  They 
concluded that the appointment of conservative Supreme Court 
Justices led to the adoption of a “color-blind jurisprudence” that 
is hostile to affirmative action and ultimately undermines racial 
equality.69  Theodore Blumoff and Harold Lewis, Jr. similarly 
concluded that the “Reagan Court” had certain policy “baselines” 
that private parties should be able to form contracts as they wish 
and that the “economy functions best with minimal government 
interference.”70  They concluded that Title VII jurisprudence ran 
“headlong into” these policy axioms, which limited the statute’s 
reach.71 
Conversely, some scholars offer explanations of Title VII’s 
development based on factors other than the Justices’ ideologies.  
For example, former United States District Court Judge Nancy 
Gertner explains that, although ideology may have played a part 
in Title VII jurisprudence, a powerful alternative theory, 
“[a]symmetric decisionmaking,”72 can, in many ways, better 
explain the development of this area of law.73  In another 
example, Anne McGinely explains at least part of the Supreme 
Court’s Title VII decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,74 based on the 
studies of “cognitive illiberalism,” which show “people of different 
67 E.g., Green, supra note 2, at 427, 435. 
68 Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 24, at 29–43. 
69 Id. at 54 (“As applied by the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court 
under Rehnquist, color-blind jurisprudence is merely a subterfuge employed by the 
Court to cover the fact that it is deliberately ignoring its own precedents on 
affirmative action prior to the ascendancy of Rehnquist to the helm of the Court.”). 
70 Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 24, at 5. 
71 Id. at 5; see also Powell, supra note 2, at 257–58, 262 (“[I]t now seems likely 
that the fate of disparate impact claims under Title VII will replicate the fate of 
affirmative action under the Court’s conservative bloc jurisprudence.” (quoting 
Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1148 (2010)); Green, 
supra note 2, at 440 (“With the appointment of Chief Justice Roberts to replace Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and the appointment of Justice Alito to replace Justice O’Connor, 
to go along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, there is a solid conservative 
block on the Supreme Court that will establish jurisprudence in Title VII cases.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
72 Gertner, supra note 37, at 110. Asymmetric decision making results from 
repeat players, such as employers, settling strong cases and litigating weak cases. 
The result over time is judicial interpretations that favor the repeat players’ 
interests. Id. at 110, 113–14. 
73 Id. at 110. 
74 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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cultural viewpoints and identities interpret[] the facts 
differently.”75  William Corbett interprets the development of 
Title VII jurisprudence as a process of “tortification,” that is, the 
incorporation of tort principles to interpret the statute’s 
meaning.76  Other analyses interpret the development of Title VII 
as a progression of the Justices’ choices on how to conduct 
statutory interpretation, with changes reflecting different 
emphasis or interpretation on textual language, statutory 
purpose, or legislative intent.77 
Thus, there is no firm consensus that Title VII case law is 
the result of the Supreme Court’s ideology.  A number of different 
potential explanations are available—some political, some not.  
This conflict among theorists is mirrored by a mixed body of law. 
B. Ideological and Nonideological Cases 
A number of Supreme Court decisions support an ideology-
based interpretation of Title VII’s history.  In these cases, the 
Court’s votes are split according to the ascribed political views of 
the Justices.78  For example, in the most recent term, the Court 
issued two major Title VII decisions with a five-to-four ideological 
75 Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: 
An Examination of Ricci v. Destefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 869 (2012–13). 
McGinley concludes that this “cultural cognition” influenced the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Ricci facts and, therefore, its grant of summary judgment to 
defendant was improper. Id. at 868–70 (attributing “the poor showing of 
employment discrimination plaintiffs to fundamental American beliefs concerning 
meritocracy and discrimination” to “psychological research [that] demonstrates that 
most people in most situations are ‘unwilling to make robust attributions of 
discrimination’ ” (quoting Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs 
and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV.  1275, 1278 (2012)). 
76 William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal To 
Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 456–67 
(2013). 
77 Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 545, 554 (2013) (“While many of [the Title VII] frameworks 
grow out of the statutory language of the federal statutes, they also derive from 
those statutes’ unique histories, as well as the choices the Supreme Court has made 
regarding how to piece together the purpose of the statutes and their legislative and 
textual history.” (citing Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing 
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 446 n.194, 479 
(2000))). 
78 For purposes of this Section, this Article ascribes a political preference to the 
Justices based on the perception indicated by the press and by scholars. Cf. SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 9, at 204, 321–22 (using statements in newspaper editorials at 
the time of a Justice’s nomination to measure that Justice’s ideology). 
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divide.  In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar,79 the Court restricted Title VII’s protections against 
retaliation by holding that plaintiffs must establish that the 
retaliatory motive was the “but-for” cause of the employment 
action, rather than meet the more lenient “motivating-factor” 
standard.80  In this conservative decision,81 Justice Kennedy, the 
swing vote,82 wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by the 
perceived conservatives, Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito, and 
Thomas.83  The four dissenting Justices, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, are all members of the liberal bloc.84  The 
Justices’ votes in Vance v. Ball State University85 show an 
identical ideological divide.  In Vance, the Supreme Court again 
restricted Title VII’s scope by broadening one of the employers’ 
defenses to liability for harassment.86  Justice Alito, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Kennedy, wrote the majority 
opinion, and Justice Thomas filed a concurrence.87  The four 
liberal Justices again dissented.88 
 
79 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
80 Id. at 2534.  
81 The description of a case outcome as conservative or liberal is based on the 
case direction designation in Harold Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database. See 
Spaeth et al., supra note 16; see also Lee Epstein & William M. Landes, Was There 
Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 565 (2012) 
(using this database to determine the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions). 
82 See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 31–32 (1996) (identifying Justice Kennedy as a swing vote 
between liberal and conservative blocks); Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/ 
opinion/31thu1.html?_r=0 (describing Justice Kennedy as a swing vote).  
83 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522; see Chemerinsky, supra note 1 (identifying the 
conservative bloc of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito); Perry, supra note 1 
(describing Justices Roberts and Alito as conservative); Wilkins et al., supra note 66 
(identifying conservative voting patterns of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and 
Alito). 
84 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522; see Chemerinsky, supra note 1 (identifying 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer as part of the liberal bloc); Charles D. Kelso & R. 
Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on Speech, 49 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 694 (2012) (identifying the current liberal bloc as Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); Liptak, supra note 1 (describing Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan as liberal). 
85 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
86 Id. at 2446–47. 
87 Id. at 2438, 2454. 
88 Id. at 2454. 
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The Nassar and Vance cases are just two of many examples 
where the Supreme Court’s decisions either limited or broadened 
the reach of Title VII, depending on whether the conservative or 
liberal Justices were able to garner a majority.  For example, in 
Connecticut v. Teal,89 the Court issued an employee-friendly 
decision with a split in Justices according to their ascribed 
political views.90  In this case, the employer claimed that a 
screening test for promotion, which disproportionately excluded 
blacks, could be excused because the ultimate percentage of 
blacks promoted reflected an appropriate racial balance.91  
Justice Brennan, a member of the liberal bloc,92 crafted the 
majority opinion rejecting this “bottom-line defense” to Title VII 
disparate impact liability,93 and fellow liberals, Justices 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall,94 joined.95  Justice White, a 
moderate Republican appointee,96 joined the majority.97  Justice 
Powell98 filed a dissenting opinion,99 joined by conservatives 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,100 along with swing vote 
Justice O’Connor.101 
89 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 444, 452. 
92 Lino A. Graglia, The Legacy of Justice Brennan: Constitutionalization of the 
Left-Liberal Political Agenda, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 189 (1999) (identifying  Justice 
Brennan as liberal). 
93 Teal, 457 U.S. at 442, 452. 
94 Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, The Liberal Legacy: The Imprint of the Warren Era 
Remains and Continues To Influence the Court, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.–Sept. 1999, 
at 13 (“Justice Blackmun and the two [J]ustices with whom he was most frequently 
aligned, William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, were the last holdouts of 
the ‘liberal’ wing.”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance 
on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 120 (2008) (describing Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan, 
and Marshall as liberal Justices). 
95 Teal, 457 U.S. at 442. 
96 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in 
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 935 n.238 (2008) (describing 
Justice White as sometimes moderate and sometimes conservative); Robert H. 
Smith, Uncoupling the “Centrist Bloc”—An Empirical Analysis of the Thesis of a 
Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United States Supreme Court, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1994) (describing Justice White as a “centrist” and noting that many commentators 
identified him as a moderate). 
97 457 U.S. at 442. 
98 Stearns, supra note 96, at 896–97 (describing Justice Powell as a moderate 
conservative). 
99 Teal, 457 U.S. at 456. 
100 Id. Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why 
Some Republican Supreme Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & 
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia,102  is another example of 
ideological voting, wherein the Supreme Court issued a 
conservative decision restricting the reach of Title VII.103  Wards 
Cove made it easier for employers to defend against a disparate 
impact suit under Title VII.104  In that case, the three Republican 
appointed swing votes, Justices White, Kennedy, and O’Connor, 
joined conservatives Justices Rehnquist and Scalia for the 
majority.105  The liberal group of Justices, Stevens, Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented.106 
Although many Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title 
VII fit the narrative of ideological voting, a significant number do 
not.  For example, since 1971, the Supreme Court issued at least 
thirty-five unanimous decisions in Title VII cases107 on such 
POL’Y REV. 457, 462 (2007) (describing conventional wisdom, confirmed by analysis 
of voting patterns, that Justice Burger was a conservative and Justice Rehnquist 
even more so); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of 
Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 48 (2007) 
(describing Rehnquist’s conservative voting patterns). 
101 457 U.S. at 456; see Smith, supra note 96 (noting the common description of 
Justice O’Connor as a centrist); Eric J. Segall, Justice O’Connor and the Rule of Law, 
17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 134 (2006) (“For most of her time on the bench, 
Justice O’Connor served as the crucial swing vote.”). 
102 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 657–59. 
105 Id. at 644. 
106 Id. 
107 The following cases were unanimous as to reasoning and result. Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 
843 (2001); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Walters v. 
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
337 (1997); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Bazemore v. 
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of 
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983); 
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 
(1978); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Chandler 
v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Love v. Pullman Co., 
404 U.S. 522 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The following 
cases were unanimous as to result. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 
(2011); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271 
(2009); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Edelman v. 
Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 
(1993); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Watson v. Ft. Worth 
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issues as same-sex harassment,108 the standard for retaliation 
claims,109 and the scope of disparate impact.110  This unanimity 
among the liberal, moderate, and conservative camps111 
undermines the claim that political preference guides Title VII 
votes.112  Indeed, in some of these cases, the Justices voted 
contrary to the expectations of their ascribed political views.  For 
example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,113 conservative 
Justice Rehnquist penned the opinion that expanded Title VII to 
include sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.114  In 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,115 Justices Rehnquist and 
Scalia agreed with the unanimous Court that disparate impact 
analysis could be extended to apply to subjective or discretionary 
promotion systems, as well as to objective tests.116  In a recent 
example, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,117 Justice 
Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court which expanded Title VII to 
prohibit employers from retaliating against third parties in order 
to punish employees who complain of discrimination.118 
Thus, an overview of Title VII—the history of amendment, 
the varied Supreme Court decisions, and the diverse scholarly 
analysis—does not conclusively establish an ideologically driven 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983);  
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982);  Furnco Const. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); see 
also Selmi, supra note 8, at 293–94 (identifying eighteen unanimous Supreme Court 
employment discrimination decisions from 1993 to 2010 and suggesting that the 
unanimity reflected the Court’s strategic response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
108 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
109 White, 548 U.S. at 60. 
110 Watson, 487 U.S. at  987. 
111 For example, in the unanimous decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court. 539 U.S. 90. 
112 Selmi, supra note 8, at 298 (noting unanimous cases indicated a shift in the 
Supreme Court toward a more pro-plaintiff position). 
113 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
114 Id. at 73. 
115 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
116 Id. at 991. 
117 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
118 Id. Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Sotomayor, Thomas, and Alito all joined in 
the majority, with Justice Kagan recusing herself and Justice Ginsburg filing a 
concurrence joined by Justice Breyer. Id. at 178–79. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 235 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 235 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX 3/24/16  12:16 PM 
858 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:841   
jurisprudence.  Those adopting the political interpretation can 
identify supporting examples, but exceptions and theories 
challenge this view.  An interdisciplinary approach can aid in 
this effort to determine whether the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on Title VII is ideological.  Political science 
scholarship on judicial decision making offers particularly 
relevant empirical evidence and theories to enhance this 
incomplete picture. 
III. USING POLITICAL SCIENCE MODELS TO ANALYZE 
 TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
Political science scholars have long studied the Supreme 
Court’s decision making,119 including empirically measuring 
whether the decisions are based on ideology, the law, or other 
factors.120  Their works study Supreme Court decisions in broader 
areas of law but can provide a useful basis for assessing whether 
Title VII jurisprudence is the result of an ideological Court.121  
The consensus among the predominant political science studies is 
that political preference does indeed drive Supreme Court 
decisions.122  Their conclusion is based on empirical 
measurements that accurately capture the political ideology of 
the Court and find statistically valid means of measuring its 
impact.123  Further, a subset of this scholarship also offers 
theoretical and empirical explanations for the exceptions when 
Justices appear to vote contrary to their political viewpoints,124 
potentially explaining the varied history of Title VII.  Ultimately, 
applying the models to Title VII reveals that the Supreme 
119 Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will It Listen? Using the 
Models of Judicial Decision-Making To Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments 
Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 305, 305 (2014) (citing PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 28–49). 
120 E.g., PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44, 71; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, 
at 312–26. 
121 Cf. Webber, supra note 119, at 332–52 (using the models of judicial decision 
making to predict how the Supreme Court will respond to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”)). 
122 E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 1 (“Much of the [political 
science] discipline has long embraced the notion that judicial outcomes primarily 
reflect judicial policy preferences . . . .”); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 23 (“It 
is generally conceded, at least among social scientists, that members of the Court 
are by and large policy seekers.”). 
123 E.g., PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44, 71; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, 
at 312–26.  
124 See supra Part II.A. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 236 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 236 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX 3/24/16  12:16 PM 
2015] IT IS POLITICAL 859 
Court’s interpretation of this statute is particularly ideological.  
The political science models that posit constraints on ideological 
voting do not match well with the history of Title VII.  At best, in 
Title VII, the only apparently effective exception to  
ideology-based voting is when the Court is faced with direct 
statutory language or long-standing precedent, a narrower 
category of constraint than in other areas of law. 
A. Summary of the Models 
Within political science, three theories, or models, of judicial 
decision making are particularly influential and supported by 
robust empirical and theoretical analysis.  First, the attitudinal 
model of judicial decision making posits that Supreme Court 
Justices125 decide cases based on their individual political 
preferences and are not constrained in that ideological pursuit by 
congressional or presidential intent, nor even by the dictates of 
the law.126  Second, the strategic model of judicial decision 
making asserts that Justices decide cases based on their 
ideologies, but under certain circumstances, are constrained by 
their coequal branches of government.127  Specifically, according 
to this model, Justices will pursue their political preference so 
long as it will not trigger a congressional response to override 
their decision.128  If Justices’ true preferences are outside the 
realm of political acceptability, such that an override or other 
congressional response is likely, Justices will modify their 
positions to fall within the realm of positions acceptable to the 
elected branches.129  Finally, recent works have espoused a third, 
integrated model that claims Justices decide cases based largely 
on ideology but are tempered in this political motive by strategic 
influences and by the constraining force of the law itself.130 
125 See Webber, supra note 119, at 309 (“Although some models have included an 
analysis of judicial decision-making in lower federal courts, the models have 
generally focused on explaining and predicting Supreme Court decisions.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
126 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 69 (2013); PACELLE 
ET AL., supra note 9, at 34–36; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 86. 
127 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10. 
128 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 97–101 (describing the strategic 
model); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 39–45 (explaining the strategic model). 
129 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 98–101. 
130 See generally id. at 101–19; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 51–52. 
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The various models of judicial decision making base their 
claims on empirical studies that test for a statistical correlation 
between the Justices’ political views and their votes in particular 
cases.131  This first model requires a valid measurement of the 
Justices’ individual ideologies.132  Political science scholars have 
developed an extensive body of work on this issue alone and offer 
empirical, standardized methods of identifying Justices’ 
respective political viewpoints.133  A complete explanation of the 
various methods used by political scientists to estimate Justices’ 
ideologies is beyond the scope of this Article.  As an extremely 
simplified description, however, the predominant methods for 
determining judicial ideology assess the Justices’ voting patterns 
and use other data and statistical methods to control for 
potential motivations other than political preference.134  For the 
purposes of this Article, it is enough to understand that Justices’ 
political preferences can be quantified through valid, testable 
methods.135 
131 E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 323; Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 
260. 
132 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 320–24 (giving an example of 
measuring the Justices’ ideologies); Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 260–61. 
133 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 215–16; see, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The 
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306–08 (2007); Lee Epstein & 
Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261, 263–65 
(1996); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. 
ANALYSIS 134, 136–40 (2002).  
134 E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 27–43; PACELLE ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 215–16; Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 251–56; Lee Epstein et al., The 
Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 601–03 
(2001); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of 
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 35–36 (1997); see also SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 9, 204, 320–22 (“To determine perceptions of nominees’ 
qualifications and judicial philosophy, we use a content analysis from statements in 
newspaper editorials from the time of the nomination until the Senate voted. The 
analysis used four of the nation’s leading papers, two with a liberal stance, the New 
York Times and the Washington Post, and two with a more conservative outlook, the 
Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times. . . . Ideology ranges from 0 (extremely 
conservative) to 1 (extremely liberal).” (footnote omitted)). 
135 Indeed, the various assessments lead to sensible results. For example, 
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist score the most conservative, Justice O’Connor as a 
moderate, and Justices such as Marshall and Brennan receive liberal scores. E.g., 
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 321–22 (“We believe that the scores accurately 
measure the perceptions of the [J]ustices’ values at the time of their nomination. 
While not everyone would agree that every score precisely measures the perceived 
ideology of each nominee, Fortas, Marshall, and Brennan are expectedly the most 
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With the Justices’ political preferences established, the 
various political science models use statistical techniques to 
measure whether a meaningful correlation exists between the 
Justices’ ideology and case votes.136  The studies also test whether 
other factors, such as legal precedent or concern for congressional 
override, influence votes.137  Political science scholars have used 
these techniques in numerous studies conducted over the last 
decade, creating a substantial body of empirical work on the role 
of ideology in Supreme Court decisions.138  Thus, the political 
science models of judicial decision making offer an 
interdisciplinary, empirical basis for assessing whether the 
Supreme Court’s Title VII’s jurisprudence is the result of the 
Justices’ ideologies. 
B. Title VII and the Attitudinal Model 
According to the attitudinal model, Supreme Court Justices 
decide cases based on their political viewpoints.139  Applied to 
Title VII, the attitudinal model explains the case law according 
to the political makeup of the Court, with defendant-employer 
friendly decisions as the result of a coalition of conservative 
Justices and pro-plaintiff employee decisions as the result of a 
liberal Justices wielding the necessary five votes.  In fact, a few 
legal scholars have found evidence connecting Title VII case 
outcomes to the ideology of the deciding Justices.  For example, 
in 2010, Margaret Lemos published an empirical study of every 
case decided by the Supreme Court “that involved a question of 
interpretation or application of Title VII.”140  She identified a 
“strong correlation” between the Justices’ votes on Title VII 
issues and their presumed political preferences141 based on her 
liberal, while Scalia and Rehnquist are the most conservative. . . . O’Connor comes 
out as a moderate, given her previous support for women’s rights and abortion.”). 
136 Again, the statistical techniques behind these studies are beyond the scope of 
this Article but are detailed at length in the predominant studies cited. See, e.g., 
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 54–60; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 312–26; 
Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 251–60. 
137 E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 68–72, 103–19. 
138 See generally PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 28–50 (describing the 
development of and the body of work on the models of judicial decision making). 
139 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 34–36; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 
86. 
140 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: 
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 388 (2010). 
141 Id. at 407–08. 
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finding that “Justices who are generally viewed as ‘liberal’ have 
cast a high proportion of ‘liberal’ votes in the Title VII context, 
while the opposite is true for Justices typically deemed 
‘conservative.’ ”142  For example, Lemos found that Justice 
Ginsburg’s and Justice Breyer’s votes  on Title VII cases were 
liberal eighty-four percent and eighty-eight percent of the time 
while Justices Scalia and Thomas were liberal only forty-three 
percent and fifty-two percent of the time.143 
In 1994, William Wines examined every Supreme Court Title 
VII decision during the Reagan era, 1980 to 1988.144  Wines found 
a distinct pattern of decisions, with Justices identified as liberal 
consistently voting to expand the reach of Title VII, Justices 
identified as conservative consistently voting to restrict the 
statute’s reach, and Justices identified as moderate providing the 
swing vote in the Court split.145  For example, for the period of 
1980 to 1985, Wines identified six expansive Supreme Court 
decisions on Title VII and five restrictive decisions.146  He then 
tallied the votes and found that Justices Rehnquist, Powell, 
Burger, and O’Connor had the most conservative record of votes 
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun had the 
most liberal.147 
142 Id. Lemos also found this correlation between the appointing President and 
the Justices’ Title VII vote. Id. at 408 (“Justices appointed by Democratic presidents 
tend to render significantly more liberal decisions than Justices appointed by 
Republican presidents.”). However, she acknowledged the significant exceptions to 
this trend and cautioned that “[s]ome of the most liberal Justices to cast votes 
during the Title VII era were appointed by Republican Presidents” and “Reagan’s 
three appointees—O’Connor (1982), Scalia (1984), and Kennedy (1988)—all proved 
to be farther to the left on Title VII issues than the Justices they replaced.” Id. 
143 Id. at 409. 
144 Wines, supra note 16, at 662. 
145 Id. at 687, 690. 
146 Id. at 685–87. 
147 Id. For the period of 1985 to 1989, Wines identified twenty Title VII 
decisions—six expanding the statute, seven restricting it, and seven maintaining the 
status quo. Id. at 688. Again, Wines identified patterns of voting that match the 
ascribed political views of the Justices. Id. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia 
consistently voted to restrict Title VII, while Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, 
and Stevens consistently voted to expand Title VII. Id. “Justices O’Connor, White 
and Powell provided the swing votes that influenced results in either direction 
depending on the issues at hand.” Id. at 688–89. Wines found that in the five Title 
VII cases at issue from the time Justice Kennedy joined the Court in February 1988 
until the end of the period studied, April 1990, Justice Kennedy consistently voted 
with the conservatives, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia. Id. at 690. Justice Kennedy 
would later be viewed as a swing vote, see Wilkins et al., supra note 82, at 32, but 
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Although these studies identify ideological voting trends, the 
attitudinal explanation of Title VII’s jurisprudence appears 
incomplete.  For example, in addition to the ideologically split 
decisions, Wines also identified a number of unanimous 
decisions,148 a finding which undermines any claim of purely 
ideological decision making by the Justices.  In fact, Wines’s 
ultimate conclusions undermine the association between ideology 
and Supreme Court votes.149  Similarly, although Lemos finds the 
expected association of liberal votes with liberal Justices, her 
results also continue to document the fact that ideology-based 
voting is not one hundred percent; indeed, according to her study, 
even Justice Thomas issues liberal votes on Title VII about half 
of the time.150 
On the surface level, these exceptions undermine the claim 
that the Supreme Court decides cases based on ideology.  The 
exceptions seem to pose the most significant challenge to the 
attitudinal model given its premise that “[J]ustices care only 
about policy”151 and this “single variable” explains their  
 
 
according to Wines, in this abbreviated period, he was conservative. See Wines, 
supra note 16, at 690. 
148 Wines, supra note 16, at 685 (noting that three of the six cases from 1980 to 
1985 that expanded Title VII were unanimous); id. at 690 (identifying two 
unanimous cases in the 1986 to 1989 period that expanded Title VII). 
149 Ultimately, although acknowledging the small sample size, Wines also found 
that “no statistically significant relationship, using a chi-square test, between voting 
pattern and Presidential appointment.” Id. at 716. He further concluded: 
[C]areful ideological screening of federal judicial candidates did not assure 
President Reagan the “correct” votes on Title VII cases in the short run as 
measured by conservative ideology . . . as late as 1989, Supreme Court 
decisions did not reflect President Reagan’s agenda for Title VII [in part] 
because, despite excellent conservative credentials, Justice O’Connor had 
voted with the liberal wing on employment discrimination issues. 
Id. at 717. 
150 Lemos, supra note 140, at 409. 
151 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 5 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra 
note 9, at 111); see also PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 35–36 (explaining the 
attitudinal model and its belief that “[J]ustices are totally unencumbered in deciding 
cases” according to their values and attitudes and are “single-minded political 
actors”); Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 588 (“Based on the attitudinal model, no 
factors other than ideology come into play [in Supreme Court decisions].”). The 
critiques of the attitudinal model often highlight the problem of its failure to 
accommodate exceptions to attitudinal voting. PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 
37–39. 
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individual decisions.152  In fact, critics challenge the attitudinal 
model as “too simplistic and too exclusive of other possible 
contributing factors” to the Supreme Court’s decision making.153 
The proponents of the attitudinal model explain, however, 
that the purpose of the model is to establish a meaningful 
measure of the Court overall, as opposed to explaining every 
individual case.154  Regardless of individual exceptions, if the 
attitudinal model establishes a strong correlation between 
ideology and judicial votes overall, this informs important 
questions,155 such as whether the Democrats made the right 
decision in limiting the ability to filibuster judicial 
appointments.156  Thus, the proponents of the attitudinal model 
offer it as the best—the most empirically validated—explanation 
of the Supreme Court’s decisions among all the theories on what 
drives the Court’s behavior.157 
Moreover, some of the exceptions to ideology-based voting 
can be explained by the importance of the issue to the Justices, or 
salience.158  Recent explorations of attitudinal theory have found 
that ideology has a stronger influence on Supreme Court votes in 
salient cases than in cases that are less salient to the Court.159  
Salience becomes a useful explanatory factor, particularly in 
light of the evidence that the issue of minority rights is 
particularly salient to the Supreme Court.160  In fact, a number of 
Supreme Court Title VII decisions where one or more Justices 
152 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 36. 
153 Id. at 37. 
154 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 45–46 (explaining that the criteria for 
evaluating a model is whether it provides a better explanation of reality than 
alternatives); Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
Making, Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 LAW & POL’Y 295, 296 (2006) 
(“What is intriguing about the [attitudinal] model is its deceptively simple but 
powerful logic: [J]ustices come to the Supreme Court with their ideological 
preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual case facts these preferences cast 
overwhelming influence on their decision making. Thus the attitudinal model is a 
complete and adequate model of Supreme Court behavior, though not a complete 
explanation for [J]ustices’ votes.” (citation omitted)). 
155 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 45–46. 
156 S. Res. 15 & 16, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). 
157 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 351. 
158 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 202. 
159 E.g., id.; Unah & Hancock, supra note 154, at 296, 307. 
160 BARNES, supra note 6, at 171 (describing empirical evidence that the 
Supreme Court is particularly resistant to congressional influence in votes on 
minority rights, noting the importance of the issue to the Court given its “special 
role in scrutinizing statutes that affect ‘suspect’ classes”). 
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voted contrary to ideology involved less salient procedural 
questions that did not implicate the scope of protections for 
minority employees.161  Thus, a Title VII decision where Justices 
voted contrary to political preference may simply reflect a case of 
less importance, rather than an exception that challenges the 
attitudinal model.  Overall, the attitudinal model provides a 
compelling explanation for a significant number of Title VII 
cases162 and supports the thesis that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area is driven by ideology. 
161 Michael Selmi found this trend in an analysis of the Court’s Title VII 
decisions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Selmi, supra note 8, at 291–92. 
Selmi drew a different conclusion about the significance of this trend, which is 
addressed in Part III.C. Less salient Title VII cases from other time periods also 
reflect this trend. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) 
(concerning the effect of class action on Title VII statute of limitations and resulting 
in a unanimous liberal outcome in case); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. 
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (concerning proper class representatives in Title VII 
class action and resulting in a unanimous conservative decision); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (concerning the effect of union arbitration 
proceeding on the right to bring claims under Title VII and resulting in a unanimous 
liberal decision); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (concerning 
administrative filing requirements and resulting in a unanimous liberal decision 
among conservative, moderate and liberal Justices). 
162 See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 113 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (conservative 
decision with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito for the majority, Justice 
Thomas concurring, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) 
(conservative decision with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito in 
the majority and Justices Steven, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the dissent); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (conservative decision with Justices 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas for the majority and Justices 
White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissenting); Wards Cove Packing, Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (conservative decision with Justices White, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy for the majority and Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting); Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 
U.S. 421 (1986) (liberal decision with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens for the majority, Justice Powell concurring, and Justices White, Burger, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor dissenting); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) 
(liberal decision with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens for 
the majority and Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor dissenting); 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (liberal decision with Justices 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun for the majority and Burger and 
Rehnquist dissenting). As noted previously, for this analysis, the case direction of 
liberal or conservative is taken from Harold Spaeth’s United States Supreme Court 
Database. Spaeth et al., supra note 16; see Epstein & Landes, supra note 81, at 565 
(adopting U.S. Supreme Court Database assessments of liberal and conservative 
decisions). For assessments of the political ideologies of the Justices, see supra notes 
in Part II.B. There are other Supreme Court Title VII decisions generally reflecting 
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C. Title VII and the Strategic Model 
Proponents of the strategic model challenge the attitudinal 
model’s premise that ideology is the only reliably predictive 
influence on the Supreme Court.163  According to the strategic 
model, although ideology has a strong influence on the Court’s 
decisions, the Supreme Court is constrained in its ideological 
voting by concern for “the potential reactions of their policy 
competitors” including Congress and the President.164  
Specifically, many proponents of the strategic model posit that 
Justices will modify their preferred position and moderate their 
vote in order to avoid an override by Congress,165 and offer their 
own empirical studies in support. 166  On its surface, the strategic 
model could provide a comprehensive explanation of Title VII’s 
varied history that acknowledges the strong, but not sole, role of 
ideology, and explains the circumstances under which ideological  
 
 
ideological voting. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999); Kolstad 
v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 755 (1989); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Johnson 
v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local 93 v. 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 
561 (1984); Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Am. Tobacco Co. 
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); Cnty. 
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 444 
U.S. 598 (1980); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); L.A. 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).  
163 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
164 Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 248. 
165 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also 
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of 
override constrains the Court); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic 
Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 
1451 (2001) (identifying the risk of override as an element of strategic theory); 
Epstein et al., supra note 135, at 595 (noting that, according to strategic theory, the 
Supreme Court “will not, in the main, issue decisions that are unacceptable to the 
ruling regime”). Some strategic scholars, however, do not rely on the risk of override 
theory and data and theorize that risk of override does not need to be effective for 
Congress or the President to constrain the Court. See Webber, supra note 119, at 
335. What this branch of the strategic model generally fails to identify, however, is 
how and when these power-based constraints are operative. Id. at 336. 
166 E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, 
supra note 9, at 9–13. 
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voting is constrained.  Ultimately, however, the strategic model 
fails as an explanatory paradigm because it does not fully 
account for the effect of enacted overrides. 
1. A Strategic Explanation of Title VII’s History 
Michael Selmi uses the strategic model of decision making to 
explain the pattern of Title VII cases following the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991167 (“CRA”).  As explained in Part II.C. above, the CRA 
amended Title VII to overturn a series of Supreme Court 
decisions on Title VII and other discrimination laws.168  Selmi 
finds that the CRA had “a meaningful restraining effect on the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” and that since its passage, the 
Court has generally been “more supportive of plaintiffs’ Title VII 
claims than it had been in the years immediately preceding the 
CRA.”169  According to Selmi, after the congressional overrides 
signaled the elected branches’ willingness to act, the Court 
strategically issued decisions more in line with those branches’ 
preferences.170  In this manner, Selmi connects Title VII 
jurisprudence with the strategic model’s premise that the Court’s 
ideological decision making is tempered by its concern for the 
views and potential response of Congress.171 
 
 
167 Selmi, supra note 8, at 282. 
168 Infra Part III.C.3. 
169 Selmi, supra note 8, at 282. For example, Selmi found that the Court issued a 
higher number of unanimous decisions subsequent to the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”), 
the majority of which favored plaintiffs. Id. at 293. These included decisions 
prohibiting same-sex harassment, reversing some lower court decisions that had 
heightened the plaintiff’s burden and “craft[ing] quite liberal principles of law 
relating to retaliation claims.” Id. at 297. 
170 Id. at 289–90. One of Selmi’s examples, the post-CRA case Desert Palace v. 
Costa, seems particularly illustrative of the strategic move that Selmi identifies. Id. 
at 295 (citing Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)). In this decision—which, 
significantly, is authored by conservative Justice Thomas—the Court interpreted 
one of the CRA amendments in a manner that expanded plaintiffs’ ability to use a 
lower causation standard to prove a case of intentional discrimination. Desert 
Palace, 539 U.S. at 101. Throughout the decision, the Court appears significantly 
constrained by the amendment. For example, Justice Thomas’s decision relied on his 
view of the unambiguous words of the amendment, which “[o]n its face . . . does not 
mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing.” Id. at 98–
99. 
171 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10, 13 (strategic premise); Bergara et 
al., supra note 10, at 248 (strategic premise). 
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Selmi’s findings are also consistent with at least one other 
Supreme Court decision prior to the CRA.  In 1976, the Supreme 
Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert172 that pregnancy-
based discrimination was not sex discrimination prohibited by 
Title VII.173  The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) 
amended Title VII in direct response to this decision and defined 
sex to include “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions.”174  Six years later, in Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock v. EEOC,175 the Court embraced the amendment and 
issued a decision based on the PDA’s instruction to treat 
pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.176  In 
their seminal work describing the strategic model, Lee Epstein 
and Jack Knight cite Newport News as a strong example of 
sophisticated, strategic Court behavior where the Justices vote 
contrary to their true preferences to avoid congressional 
rebuke.177 
2. Limits to the Strategic Model: Lack of Evidence on Enacted 
Overrides 
Many proponents of the strategic model posit that Justices 
will modify their preferred positions and moderate their votes to 
avoid an override by Congress.178  As set forth in the author’s 
prior work, the strategic model generally has limited relevance 
for employment discrimination statutes because the model relies 
too heavily on this risk of reversal theory and empirical 
evidence.179  The strategic model’s limited focus of its empirical 
172 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
173 Id. at 138–40. 
174 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). 
175 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
176 Id. at 684. 
177 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 15–17. 
178 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also 
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of 
override constrains the Court); Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1451 (same); 
Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 595 (“[According to strategic theory,] the Court will 
not, in the main, issue decisions that are unacceptable to the ruling regime.”). Some 
strategic scholars, however, do not rely on the risk of override theory and data and 
theorize that the risk of override does not need to be effective for Congress or the 
President to constrain the Court. See Webber, supra note 119, at 335–36. What this 
branch of the strategic model generally fails to identify, however, is how and when 
these power-based constraints are operative. Id. 
179 Webber, supra note 119, at 328–36. 
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evidence, which mainly consists of studies showing that a risk of 
override constrains the Supreme Court, fails to prove strategic 
action in circumstances, such as Title VII, where the law is 
shaped by enacted overrides.180 
To begin with the mere existence of enacted overrides 
presents a challenge to strategic theory.  If, as the strategic and 
integrated models claim, the Court will strategically move its 
preferred position in light of the congressional risk of override, 
then, conversely, when the override does occur, it is because the 
Justices were unconcerned with congressional response.  This is 
consistent with the attitudinal, not the strategic, model.181  To 
claim, as strategists do, that the risk of overrides constrains the 
Court, the strategic model must explain why overrides occur, 
otherwise it appears the Court simply engaged in attitudinal, 
that is ideological, voting and Congress responded.182 
The strategists do offer explanations—for example, overrides 
may occur because the Court erred in assessing the risk or did 
not sufficiently moderate its position to fall within Congress’s 
acceptable range of outcomes, or because the makeup of Congress 
changed between the time of the Court’s vote and the time of the 
overriding legislation.183  These explanations, however, are not 
fully supported by empirical evidence.184  If overrides occur 
because of errors in calculating the risk of override or the 
makeup of Congress changes, then, according to the logic of the 
strategic model, once the override has passed this clear rebuke by 
the current elected branches, it should move the Court into 
conformity.185  A strategic postoverride Court would move its 
preferred ideological position on cases in response to the 
overriding act; otherwise, the Court votes that are later 
overridden are just as equally well explained by ideological 
voting, unconcerned with other branches, as by strategic error.186  
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 330–32. 
182 See Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1457–58 (“[Examples of overrides] 
actually indicate that the Court does not feel constrained by the risk of 
reversal. . . . The mere existence of reversals does not disprove the [strategic] 
theory . . . but the existence is better evidence against the constraint theory than for 
it.”). 
183 Webber, supra note 119, at 330, 332–34. 
184 Id. at 333–35. 
185 Id. at 333. 
186 Id. at 333–35. 
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The strategic modelists, however, have generally failed to study 
whether an override by Congress subsequently reins in the 
Court’s ideology-based voting.187 
In fact, the few studies of enacted overrides are either 
inconclusive or show just the opposite, that the Court does not 
move its position in response to enacted overrides, at least in 
certain types cases.188  Specifically, in the most relevant example 
of override study, Jeb Barnes found that, although overrides 
have an effect on judicial decisions in general; that effect was 
absent in the context most relevant to Title VII.189  According to 
Barnes, where the issues involve protection of minority rights, 
legislative overrides do not restrain courts from pursing their 
political preferences.190  Thus, the existing evidence more 
strongly supports the attitudinal model claim that Justices act 
according to ideology without regard for the potential response of 
the elected branches.  In the absence of empirically based 
explanations for why and when overrides occur, the strategic 
model does not silence the alternative, ideological explanation. 
3. The Supreme Court’s Resistance to Title VII Overrides 
This gap or inconsistency in the models’ empirical evidence is 
particularly significant to the analysis of Title VII’s 
jurisprudence in this Article.  Congress has repeatedly amended 
Title VII to overturn conservative Supreme Court interpretations 
of its provisions.191  If, as strategic modelists claim192—and 
integrated modelists claim in part193—the Supreme Court is 
constrained by its coequal branches, surely it would alter its Title 
VII jurisprudence in the face of such a clear effort by those 
branches to assert their position.  This expected change of 
judicial course, however, has not occurred.  As with the strategic 
and integrated models’ empirical studies, the history of Title VII, 
is more consistent with attitudinal, that is ideological, voting, 
with the Supreme Court resisting congressional and executive 
efforts to constrain them. 
187 Id. at 332–35. 
188 Id. at 339–43. 
189 BARNES, supra note 6, at 136–37, 171. 
190 Id. at 171. 
191 See supra Part I.C. 
192 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 154–57. 
193 E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
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As explained above, Selmi makes the opposite claim, 
asserting that after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”), which 
amended Title VII in order to overturn a number of conservative 
Supreme Court cases, the Court shifted its position and issued 
more liberal decisions.194  At the same time, Selmi also found a 
significant number of post-CRA cases where the Justices 
continued to follow their political preferences.195  For example, 
Selmi cites Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,196 a post-
CRA decision in which the Court made it substantially more 
difficult for plaintiffs to bring unequal pay claims.197  
Significantly, just two years after the decision, Congress passed 
and President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, which amended Title VII in order to overturn this 
decision.198 
The Ledbetter case poses a challenge to the strategic and 
integrated theories, specifically to the modelists who posit that 
the Supreme Court moves its position to avoid congressional 
override.  The Supreme Court must have been aware of the risk 
that its Ledbetter decision could be overridden; Justice Ginsburg 
directly called for such an override in her dissent.199  Given this 
clear risk of override, according to strategic models, the 
conservative members of the Court should have moderated their 
position to avoid congressional response;200 however, they failed 
to do so.  In fact, as Selmi explains, Ledbetter is just one of a 
number of post-CRA decisions in which the Court’s conservative 
members did not moderate their preferences despite the Act and 
its strong signal that the elected branches intended a broader 
interpretation of Title VII.201  Moreover, subsequent to the 
194 Selmi, supra note 8, at 281. 
195 Id. at 282. 
196 550 U.S. 618, 623–24 (2007). 
197 Selmi, supra note 8, at 299–300. 
198 Id. (citing Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.)). 
199 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661. 
200 E.g., Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 592–95. 
201 Selmi, supra note 8, at 298; Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1457. As Cross 
and Nelson explain, the decisions limiting the scope of Title VII after the CRA 
“demonstrate that the courts do not seem to respond to the risk of an override.” Id. 
at 1457. “Congress made quite clear in . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that it 
wanted a more liberal interpretation of civil rights statutes and was prepared to 
legislate to this effect. Yet the Court continued its pattern of conservative 
interpretation of those statutes despite their amendment.” Id. 
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publication of Selmi’s analysis, the Supreme Court issued two 
additional decisions in Title VII which substantially limit Title 
VII’s reach.202  All of these postoverride ideology-based decisions 
would seem to undermine any claim that the strategic or 
integrated model can explain Title VII’s jurisprudence. 
Selmi, however, maintains this claim.203  Although he 
describes a mix of post-CRA Supreme Court decisions, some 
apparently constrained by the Act and some apparently not, 
Selmi describes the overall behavior of the Court as strategic.204  
According to Selmi, the Court moved its position in a strategic 
response to the CRA, except in the “most ideological”205 or 
“controversial and important”206 cases.  He concludes that the 
CRA changed the Court207 in those cases that did not implicate 
its clear preferences,208 but that in cases that mattered most209 to 
the Court, the Justices followed their respective political 
preferences.210  Selmi’s explanation has appeal.  It is indeed 
strategic for Justices to issue opinions that risk congressional 
rebuke only in cases that are most significant. 
This is not, however, the precise meaning of strategic 
behavior according to political theory.  In Selmi’s explanation, 
the trigger for strategic movement is salience.211  The Supreme 
Court will move its position in response to other branch 
preferences so long as the issue is not too important to the 
Justice’s particular ideology.212  According to strategic political 
theory, however, the trigger for strategic position movement is 
not salience, but rather, risk of override, or other congressional 
202 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) 
(holding that a heightened causation standard applies to Title VII retaliation 
claims); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (limiting employer 
liability for sexual harassment by narrowly defining supervisor). 
203 Selmi, supra note 8, at 301–02. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 282. 
206 Id. at 292, 298 (“In the most significant cases . . . defendants continue to 
prevail, and often by five to four majorities. In these cases, the Court continues to 
impose its preferences, but now does so while also issuing a series of pro-plaintiff 
decisions, most of which likely do not implicate clear preferences of the Court.”). 
207 Id. at 301 (“[T]he cases decided after 1991 reveal a decidedly different 
Supreme Court from the one that prompted passage of the CRA.”). 
208 Id. at 298. 
209 Id. at 291. 
210 Id. at 291–92, 298, 300–01. 
211 Id. at 298. 
212 Id. at 290–91. 
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rebuke.213  That is, the Court will move its position if it has 
reliable information that the current Congress would override or 
potentially use its other powers—such as budget—in response to 
a decision.214 
Indeed, Congress is more likely to override a Court decision 
when it concerns controversial and important matters.215  
Overrides require effort and time only a motivated elected body 
will invest;216 logically, Congress is less likely to do so for less 
significant issues.  Selmi asserts that the Title VII pattern is to 
act according to preference even in the matters most likely to 
draw congressional attention.217  This is the opposite premise of 
strategic political theory.218  The refusal to move position in cases 
of ideological importance is actually more, or at least equally, 
consistent with the attitudinal model which claims that Justices 
decide cases according to political preference regardless of the 
views of its coequal branches.219  In fact, a study by political 
science scholars Isaac Unah and Ange-Marie Hancock found that 
salience is a trigger for attitudinal, not strategic, voting by 
Justices.220  Their empirical study finds that the more salient the 
issue is to the Court, the more likely the Court is to engage in 
ideology-based voting, rather than strategic behavior.221  
213 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 12–15, 138–39, 154–57; Bergara et 
al., supra note 10, at 247–51; Cross & Nelson, supra note 166, at 1450, 1452, 1445–
46, 1459–60; Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 592–94; Jeffrey A. Segal et al., 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (2011); see also BAILEY & 
MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 13–14 (describing strategic theory); EPSTEIN ET AL, 
supra note 126, at 85–86 (describing strategic theory); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 39–40, 42–45 (same). 
214 E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also 
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of 
override constrains the Court); Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1451 (identifying 
the role of risk of override in strategic theory); Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 595 
(“[According to strategic theory,] the Court will not, in the main, issue decisions that 
are unacceptable to the ruling regime.”). The empirical basis for strategic theory 
matches its theoretical premise and demonstrates Court movement due to concern 
for risk of override or other congressional rebuke. See, e.g., Bergara et al., supra note 
10; Segal et al., supra note 213. 
215 See BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 117. 
216 See, e.g., Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1452–53. 
217 Selmi, supra note 8, at 292. 
218 See supra note 201. 
219 See supra Part III.B. 
220 Unah & Hancock, supra note 154, at 209–13. 
221 Id. Bailey and Maltzman found the opposite: that strategic considerations 
were more likely to constrain the Court on salient issues. BAILEY & MALTZMAN, 
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Moreover, two political science analyses of the CRA came to the 
opposite conclusion of Selmi; both Jeb Barnes, and Frank Cross 
and Blake Nelson, respectively, found that the CRA did not 
constrain the Court from its ideological voting.222 
Thus, the post-CRA history of Title VII is more indicative of 
an ideological, attitudinal Court rather than a strategic Court.  
As the CRA example demonstrates, the strategic model is not the 
most compelling explanation of Title VII’s history and, 
particularly given the Court’s resistance to Title VII overrides, 
the attitudinal explanation is more accurate. 
D. Title VII and the Integrated Model 
As explained in Part III.A., the integrated model of judicial 
decision making, like the strategic model, finds that Justices’ 
political preferences influence decisions but are constrained by 
strategic concerns.223  Although the integrated modelists improve 
the empirical basis for the role of strategic factors,224 their studies 
are also premised on risk of override acting as the restraining 
force.225  For the reasons explained above, this limits the utility of 
this theory in the Title VII context where that risk has been 
supra note 10, at 117–20. However, this conclusion still contradicts Selmi’s finding 
that in the most salient post-CRA cases, the Court was less constrained. As noted 
above, Selmi’s finding is more consistent with attitudinal voting. 
222 In his seminal study of overrides, Jeb Barnes describes the CRA as a failed 
override, explaining that the Supreme Court still followed its own preferences after 
its passage. BARNES, supra note 6, at 13–15 (noting, for example, that following the 
CRA, the Supreme Court still felt free to create its own employer-friendly standard 
for punitive damages, contrary to the language of the statute). Frank B. Cross and 
Blake Nelson similarly describe the Supreme Court’s response to the CRA as 
ideological with the conservative Court ignoring Congress’s clear message that it 
intended a broader interpretation of Title VII. Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 
1456–57. Indeed, Cross and Nelson describe the Court’s response to the CRA as a 
“model case study in the shortcomings of the legislative override.” Id. at 1456; see 
also Widiss, supra note 42, at 538–45 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s reliance 
on “shadow precedents” undermined the efficacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
223 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 53. 
224 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 101–20 (describing the lack of 
consensus in empirical strategic studies, the challenges for empirical studies in this 
area, and presenting methods to address those challenges);  PACELLE ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 45–47, 51–62 (describing critiques of prior legal and strategic model 
empirical studies and presenting the research design of an approach to address 
these critiques). 
225 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 103–08; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 
9, at 54–61. 
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routinely ignored by the Court.  The integrated model, however, 
further finds that Justices’ political preferences are also 
constrained by legal factors, and, specifically, this model offers 
empirical studies that demonstrate the restraining effect of 
precedent.226  The role of precedent could therefore provide an 
alternative explanation for the Title VII cases where the Justices 
appear to vote contrary to ideology.227 
For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,228 the 
Court expanded Title VII in a liberal direction, holding that the 
disparate impact theory was not limited to objective practices 
such as screening tests and that subjective employment practices 
could be challenged for causing a disparate impact based on 
gender, race, or other protected category.229  The decision was 
unanimous as to this holding with conservative Justices Scalia 
and Rehnquist joining moderate Justices O’Connor, White, and 
Kennedy—along with liberal Justices Stevens, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Brennan—in voting for this liberal outcome.230  
The Supreme Court first created the disparate impact doctrine in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,231 and its long history of cases 
developing that theory played a major role in the Watson 
decision.232  As Justice O’Connor explained in the opinion of the 
Court, “[O]ur decisions in Griggs and succeeding cases could 
largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were applied only 
to standardized selection practices.”233  Thus, in Watson, 
precedent appeared to restrain the conservative—and potentially 
the moderate—Justices’ political preferences, resulting in a 
unanimous liberal outcome. 
Overall, the integrated model’s theory and evidence 
regarding precedent offers a useful explanation for some of the 
Title VII cases where ideological voting did not occur.  In a 
number of cases where the Justices voted contrary to political 
226 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 11, at 121–39; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 
9, at 51–62. 
227 PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 68. 
228 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
229 Id. at 990. 
230 Id. at 981, 990. 
231 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
232 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–91. 
233 Id. at 989. 
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preference, the Justices relied heavily on precedent.234  That said, 
Congress has repeatedly overruled Supreme Court precedent on 
234 E.g., Lorace v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 913 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Although I remain convinced that the Court misconstrued Title VII 
in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, and in Delaware State College v. Ricks, the 
Court has correctly applied those decisions to the case at hand. And it is the Court's 
construction of the statute—rather than the views of an individual Justice—that 
becomes a part of the law.” (citations omitted) (joining in a conservative outcome )); 
see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011) (resulting in 
a unanimous liberal outcome based on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), precedent);  AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 710–
11 (2009) (resulting in a conservative outcome for which liberal Justices Souter and 
Stevens joined, based on precedential impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976)); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) 
(resulting in a unanimous conservative decision based on clear precedent concerning 
severe or pervasive); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–79 
(1998) (resulting in a unanimous liberal outcome relying on series of major 
precedents on harassment and reverse discrimination); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 
U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (resulting in a unanimous liberal outcome based on Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), precedent); Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–17 (1983) (resulting in unanimous decision 
with both conservative and liberal outcomes based in large part on McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), precedent); Zipes v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 399–400 (1982) (resulting in a unanimous holding that 
retroactive seniority was appropriate remedy in light of precedent case Franks v. 
Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981) (unanimous conservative outcome based on McDonnell 
Douglas and other precedent); Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–80 
(1978) (resulting in a unanimous conservative decision relying on McDonnell 
Douglas and other precedent); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 
308 (1977) (using reasoning based on International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), precedent and resulting in a conservative 
decision in which liberal Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stewart, and Marshall 
joined); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139–43 (1977) (relying on Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Gilbert to determine whether employer 
policies regarding pregnancy leave were violations of Title VII and resulting in a 
unanimous liberal decision). The effect of precedent was not universal, however. See, 
e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763–64, 766 (1998) (using 
binding precedent in Meritor and resulting in  conservative Justice Rehnquist 
joining Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens in liberal decision, with Justices Scalia 
and Thomas dissenting); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (using 
binding precedent in Meritor and resulting in conservative Justice Rehnquist joining 
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens in a liberal decision, with Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissenting); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141–44 (2004) 
(using analogous labor law precedent, consistent court of appeals outcomes, and 
analogous Title VII precedent, conservative Justices joined in a liberal outcome with 
conservative Justice Thomas dissenting); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 
U.S. 101, 110–11, 116, 123 (2002) (relying on statutory language and precedent, 
conservative Justice Thomas authored a liberal opinion joined by Justices Souter, 
Stevens, and Ginsburg, conservative Justices Rehnquist and Scalia dissenting). 
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Title VII.235  As a result, the influence of the legal factor of 
precedent in Title VII jurisprudence is interrupted by, and 
stands in conflict with, the legal factor of statutory language.236  
Thus, precedent’s constraining force may provide an explanation 
of the Title VII cases where Justices voted contrary to ideology, 
but only a limited one.237  The open and perhaps more pressing 
question for Title VII analysis is what effect the law—in the form 
of statutory overriding language—has on the Supreme Court.  
The integrated model studies do not fully answer this question. 
The effect of overriding statutes on the Supreme Court is 
particularly relevant as such statutes embody both strategic 
factors, that is the elected branches’ viewpoint, and legal factors, 
such as a binding rule of law for a particular subject.  As set forth 
above, the Title VII overrides were not effective in generally 
235 See supra Part I.C. 
236 In fact, Deborah Widiss has found that the persistent influence of precedent 
undermines the effectiveness of the various amendments to Title VII. Widiss, supra 
note 42. Widiss, for example, describes the courts’ practice of using “shadow 
precedents”—that is, continuing to follow overridden precedent despite explicit 
congressional amendments to Title VII which overturned those decisions. Id. at 536–
56. 
237 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the 
Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 983 (1996) 
(“90.8% of the [Supreme Court] votes conform to the [J]ustices’ revealed preferences. 
That is, only 9.2% of the time did a [J]ustice switch to the position established in the 
landmark precedent.”). The decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
provides a compelling example of the limits of precedent as an explanatory factor 
and the need to better understand the role of overriding statutory language. 557 
U.S. 167, 174 (2009). In Gross, the Supreme Court refused to extend one of the 
CRA’s overriding amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”). Id. at 174–75. The ADEA is a separate statute from Title VII, but it has 
many similarities in language. The CRA amended Title VII to create a lower 
causation standard, “mixed motive,” that made it easier to for plaintiffs to prove 
discrimination. Id. at 173–74. However, Congress did not amend the ADEA in this 
manner. Id. Prior to Gross, courts generally interpreted the ADEA according to the 
same law and standards as Title VII. Id. at 183. In Gross, the Supreme Court held 
that because Congress only amended Title VII in the CRA, the CRA’s broad 
language allowing for “mixed motive causation” could not apply to the ADEA. Id. at 
174–75. The Court went even further to reject its own prior precedent that had 
judicially created a less stringent mixed motive standard, leaving ADEA plaintiffs 
with the much more difficult task of proving but-for causation. Id. at 178–79. Thus, 
the decision was strongly shaped by the Court’s view of statutory language and 
history, not by precedent. See Selmi, supra note 8, at 299 (suggesting that the 
different results under Title VII and the ADEA may be a sign of the importance of 
statutory language). The limits of congressional override left the Court free to vote 
according to political preference and ignore precedent in the process. See Debra A. 
Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012). 
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constraining the Supreme Court’s ideological voting patterns.  
However, in the narrow circumstance where the statute’s 
language provided on-point guidance, the Supreme Court did 
seem to take notice.238  Thus, in a number of Title VII cases 
where the Justices voted contrary to ideology, they appeared to 
do so in light of on-point statutory language.239  This is consistent 
with Barnes’s study, which found that the more directly an 
overriding statute addressed an issue, the more likely the 
override was to influence subsequent Court decisions.240  Indeed, 
238 For this restraint to work, however, the statute must be clear and 
substantive on the issue at hand. As the author has explained in prior work, if the 
statute is not sufficiently substantive and leaves room for interpretation, that room 
will allow for ideological voting. See generally Webber, supra note 119. 
239 E.g., White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–62 (2006) (using statutory differences between 
Title VII’s antidiscrimination and retaliation provisions to reach a unanimous 
liberal outcome); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussed supra in 
Part III.D.); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278–79 
(2009) (reaching a unanimous outcome by reasoning that to rule otherwise would 
undermine Faragher-Ellerth precedent); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 
187, 211–24 (1991) (concurring in the outcome, conservative Justices Rehnquist and 
Scalia concur based on § 703(h) of Title VII and Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
amendment to Title VII’s language); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 
68–69 (1986) (relying on statutory language regarding religious accommodation, 
liberal Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined the conservative outcome); Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73–77 (1984) (reaching a liberal outcome joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, Burger, White, and Powell); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321, 334 (1977) (finding that the BFOQ defense should be narrowly defined, based 
on “the restrictive language of § 703(e)” of Title VII along with legislative history 
and EEOC guidance and reaching a liberal outcome in which conservative Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist joined); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348–53 (exempting seniority 
systems from Title VII liability based on language of § 703(h) of Title VII in a 
decision where liberal Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in a 
conservative result that); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73–75, 
79–83 (1977) (using the language of §§ 703(h) and 703(j) of Title VII to reach a 
conservative outcome joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens); 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–80 (1976) (holding 
unanimously among liberal, conservative and moderate Justices that Title VII 
applied to white employees as well as black employees) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of ‘any individual’ because of ‘such individual's 
race[.]’ Its terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular 
race.” (citations omitted)); cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257–64 
(1994) (concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had no clear statutory directive 
on retroactivity, the liberal Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens joined the 
conservative outcome); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–67 (recognizing sexual harassment as 
a form of sex discrimination by relying on statutory language, EEOC Guidelines, 
and uniformity of holdings among circuit courts resulting in a unanimous liberal 
outcome). 
240 BARNES, supra note 6, at 80, 90–91 (stating that prescriptive overriding 
statutes “on their face, attempt to resolve the override issue” and have more 
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even given the ideological behavior of the Court, it is unlikely 
that the Court would reject explicit statutory directives as doing 
so—in the absence of a constitutional basis—would be an affront 
to the basic power of the legislature. 
Statutes, however, frequently leave room for interpretation 
or other open questions that provide the space for ideological 
decisions to enter.  Moreover, straightforward statutory 
questions are far less likely to be resolved by the Supreme 
Court.241  As a result, the Supreme Court may be slightly 
constrained in its ideological voting by the force of law in the 
form of statutory language, but this constraint is limited.  
Overall, legal factors in the form of precedent and direct 
statutory language offer some, albeit limited, explanatory utility 
for Title VII, and, to this extent only, the integrated model is 
effective. 
IV. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The political science models of judicial decision making 
provide an empirical basis for concluding that Supreme Court 
Justices’ political viewpoints have and continue to shape Title 
VII case law.  The studies by proponents of the attitudinal, 
strategic and integrated models all demonstrate that the 
Justices’ ideology plays a role in Supreme Court’s decisions.242  
These results are consistent with the dozens of Title VII cases 
where the Court split along ideological lines.243  Moreover, 
Barnes’s study shows that Title VII’s main subject, the protection 
of the rights of minorities, is an area where judicial ideology is 
particularly strong and particularly resistant to constraint.244  
Indeed, even in the face of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a 
sweeping congressional override of over ten conservative 
influence on the courts than partial overrides that delegate significant aspects of the 
law to the courts). 
241 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A 
Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 789 (2009) (“That a Justice’s ideology 
plays a significant role in his or her votes . . . is not surprising; since the lower courts 
will have decided the straightforward cases—cases that can be decided on the basis 
of the orthodox materials of legal decision-making, such as statutory or 
constitutional text and precedent, the cases that the Supreme Court decides will 
tend to involve disputes that cannot be resolved legalistically.”). 
242 See supra Part III.A. 
243 See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
244 BARNES, supra note 6, at 171. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 246 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 246 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX 3/24/16  12:16 PM 
880 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:841   
Supreme Court decisions, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, which promptly overturned yet another restrictive Title VII 
decision, conservative Justices continue to vote to limit Title VII’s 
reach.245  Overall, the models provide a compelling case that Title 
VII’s jurisprudence reflects ideology-based decision making by 
the Supreme Court. 
Less successful are efforts to use the political science models 
of judicial decision making to explain the exceptions to 
ideological voting in Title VII.  The strategic and integrated 
models offer theories on how and when Justices from a 
predominantly ideological Supreme Court can be constrained to 
vote contrary to their preference.  However, given these models’ 
failure to study enacted overriding statutes, the strategic and 
integrated theories do not provide an effective explanatory 
paradigm for Title VII.  Instead, in this highly political area of 
law, only a smaller category of constraints—cases that are less 
salient, or governed by strong precedent or clear statutory 
language—appeared to have had any effect on the Court’s 
otherwise ideological voting. 
This result has important implications for advocates seeking 
to shape the laws of employment equity.  As just one recent 
example, the established role of viewpoint in decision making 
may justify limits on the ability to use filibuster to block judicial 
appointments.246  Moreover, those seeking to add important new 
protected classes247 should consider whether the proposed law 
leaves room for ideological Supreme Court decisions that will 
undermine its effect.  Further, if the Supreme Court will shape 
Title VII according to ideology more than law, perhaps the time 
and effort of yet another override is better spent on the 
presidential elections.  Alternatively, this result may add a 
compelling reason to shift employment equity advocacy away  
 
 
 
 
245 See supra Part III.C. 
246 S. Res. 15, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted); see also S. Res. 16, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (enacted). 
247 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
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from individual rights litigation to benefit-based laws248 or other 
nontraditional approaches249 that may be less susceptible to 
judicial interference. 
 
248 See, e.g., Our Issues, BETTER BALANCE, http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/ 
ourissues (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
249 E.g., Kirsten K. Davis, Extending the Vision: An Empowerment Identity 
Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to School Involvement Leave 
Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 613, 658 (2010). 
